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The institutional foundations of the German economy explain
why it has handled the economic crisis more effectively than
other European states.
by Blog Admin
Germany’s economy has experienced a transition from the ‘sick man of Europe’ after
unification in 1990, to becoming a relative ‘winner ’ during the current economic crisis. Gregory
Jackson and Arndt Sorge argue that while explanations for economic performance typically
focus on macroeconomic and fiscal policies, the evolution of institutions within a state can also
be highly significant. The institutional changes which have occurred within Germany since the
end of the 1970s go some way toward explaining why the country has managed to deal with
the crisis more successfully than other states.
In dealing with the post-2007 economic crises, both academics and polit icians have f ocused
on causes and solutions using macroeconomic and f iscal policies. We argue that more
attention is needed on the wider institutional f oundations of  the productive economy, and
how these might generate economic stability and sustainable growth. Such institutions are
ultimately more important than controlling the f loodgates of  macro aggregates. Here the
German experience may be highly instructive given its economic strength in export
manuf acturing and strong development of  institutional coordination across dif f erent
spheres of  the economy. To better understand how Germany’s ‘non- liberal’ capitalism worked in the context
of  the crisis, we looked at the long-term evidence f or institutional change during the same period when
neo-liberal policies f irst took hold in the USA and Britain until the resulting economic crisis (1979 to 2009).
We concentrate on changes in f inancial markets, corporate governance, employment and industrial
relations, and training and skill f ormation.
In Germany, changes in f inance, the emergence of  shareholder-value management styles, declining
coverage of  collective bargaining, and certain educational ref orms all point towards a type of  convergence,
set in motion by both institutional imitation and supranational regulation.  But within this broad tend toward
more liberal and market-oriented institutions; we also observe a simultaneous continuity in non-market
f orms of  coordination. For example, while shareholder value capitalism has made major inroads into publicly
quoted enterprises, the climate of  industrial relations has retained strong elements of  cooperation.
Employee representatives on supervisory boards have smoothed this development, rather than being
crushed by it. Employers and polit icians have moved to scale down codetermination in large enterprises, but
have not succeeded despite the governing center-right coalit ion. A new exchange f or small joint-stock
companies (Neuer Markt) was established but subsequently crumbled again. Industry level collective
bargaining has very much come under pressure, but nevertheless, the coordination and solidarity in wage
negotiations helped maintain unit labour productivity and the competit iveness of  enterprises.
Much polit ical economy literature on institutions has been side-tracked by a half - f ull or half -empty debate
about change, rather than developing historical analysis of  how continuity and change condition one
another. We distinguish ‘proximate institutions’ as specif ic, normative and tangible norms governing
economic action in a particular domain and ‘background institutions’ as more f undamental and less specif ic
and f ormalised (e.g. general assumptions about trust or distrust, cooperation or competit ion, as applying
to roughly circumscribed situations). Institutional continuity is subject to the dialectics between concrete,
specif ic and tangible ‘proximate institutions’ at the surf ace of  the institutional landscape, and ‘background
institutions’ at deeper levels. The bedrock of  more inert institutional continuity shapes the direction and
precise content of  institutional change. A ‘metatradit ion’ of  institutional continuity exists that in no way
contradicts substantial institutional change. Even radical institutional change always involves a
recombination of  the ‘new’ with the ‘old’ institutions in creative, original and of ten surprising ways. We add
to this that ‘new’ proximate institutions may be complemented and amalgamated with institutional innovation
that draws on resources and capacities embodied by ‘old’ institutions.
Three dynamics have dif f erent ef f ects with regard to institutional convergence and divergence across
countries or between dif f using global practices and local institutions:
1) International trends stemming f rom supranational government (such as the EU) or quasi-government
(e.g. the normative importance of  US stock exchanges, the OECD or International Accounting Standards)
clearly produce some convergence. These institutional rules are mostly of  a market- liberalising variety most
visible in new codes of  practice and international regulation.
2) The socio-polit ical situation of  each country creates dif f erentiated contingencies and temporalit ies that
shape institutional change. This ef f ect works towards divergence-within-convergence. The German case
suggests that polit ical contingencies cannot be read directly of f  the strength of  lef t or right polit ical
parties, or f ormal rules of  the polit ical system. The selective adoption, dif f erential implementation and
complex ef f ects of  liberalisation requires looking at historical processes.
3) Inertial bedrock of  background institutions (i.e. basic structures, belief s and habitualised disposit ions) is
of ten invoked by collective actors as a resource and applied to deal with change coming f rom the
international scene and af f ecting signif icant change in proximate institutions. This dynamic asserts the
specif icity, or divergence, of  proximate institutions.
Corporate governance shows the clearest convergence ef f ects in Germany, notably in f inancial and
accounting standards, in the dissolving of  share cross-ownership, and in the taking-on-board of  EU
directives or other international rules on take-overs, f inancial markets and corporate governance. Here
international laws and standards had the most direct impact. On the other hand, existing institutions of
codetermination have also proved to be resilient; they shaped how these imported practices are f ramed
and understood in practice—an institutional compromise between conf licting value rational logics.
The second ef f ect, of  divergence within convergence, is exemplif ied by increases in enterprise level
bargaining and declining union strength, together with the renewed use of  these tools f or both enterprise
competit iveness and socio-polit ical aspirations. Distinctive contingencies f or Germany are visible:
Unif ication led to problems of  industrial wage bargaining and competit iveness in view of  rapidly rising wage
and non-wage labour costs; the subsequent ef f ect of  this crisis was to alert the social partners and
governments to non-wage labour costs and bring back wage restraint.  While Germany is not immune to
trends of  widening inequality as an ef f ect of  liberalisation, f irms have retained a core long-term labour
f orce with high skills.
The third ef f ect, the assertion of  institutional continuit ies, is visible in adherence to codetermination
despite polit ical pressures and reduced union strength, in the disappearance of  the Neuer Markt af ter its
init ial success, and in the renaissance of  wage restraint in aid of  competit iveness, export perf ormance and
limiting the public sector f inancial burden.
Altogether, f rom being a relative winner af ter the crises f ollowing the demise of  Bretton Woods in 1972,
through turning into a timid adopter of  neoliberalism and being styled as the ‘sick man of  Europe’ af ter
unif ication, Germany again became a relative winner af ter 2007, by enabling itself  competit ively to supply
the goods that world demand will buy.
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